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Abstract - A vast majority of medical information systems 
use Standard Query Language databases (SQL) as the 
underlying technology to deliver medical records in a 
timely and efficient manner. SQL is a standardised and 
well entrenched database technology, which allows for the 
development of robust, customised applications for 
information management.  In recent years, SQL has been 
used as the back-end to many successful web client 
accessible applications.  The use of SQL in this manner 
has been greatly enhanced through the development of 
server side scripting languages such as Microsoft ASP and 
open source systems such as PHP. These allow for the 
representation and extraction of data from a database and 
have a range of manipulation and display possibilities 
allowing a developer a rich tapestry of options. However, 
these scripting languages have enabled the ability for 
malicious users to directly modify, manipulate or destroy 
SQL databases.  In addition to those server side scripting 
language problems there is also malicious software in the 
form of worms specifically targeting SQL databases. 
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1 Introduction 
Increasingly medical practitioners are either being 
encouraged or forced to use information technology to 
make the businesses more efficient or accountable. This 
impetus for adoption of information technology into 
modern medical practices comes from several sectors.  In 
the case of Australia, the Australian Federal government 
has either mandated or provided significant financial 
incentive for medical practitioners to modernise their 
practices by installing Information Systems.  Similar 
schemes are also to be found other nation states around the 
world.  As well as government forces requiring a move into 
information technology many of the medical supply 
companies are likewise following suit. Whether it be 
physical goods such as pharmaceutical or the provision of 
knowledge such as test results for pathology or x-ray of 
these suppliers increasingly are requiring ordering and 
delivery of goods and services via electronic systems that 
utilise the Internet as a principal conduit.  
Consequently, as a result of this trend, medical practices 
are now availing themselves of broadband technologies 
and SQL enabled medical practice/client management 
databases to meet this demand and also provide them with 
strategic advantage through the usage of IT. There is little 
argument that a modern database (typically SQL) centric 
information system will garner significant cost savings and 
strategic advantage for any information dependent 
organization. This cost saving is principally in timely 
delivery of information for legitimate purposes or use by 
the organisation. In addition to increased speed of retrieval 
and the ability to perform meaningful analysis and searches 
on data, cost savings can be found in significantly reduced 
storage space required to house records. A standard 2m tall 
rack with a foot print of 0.25m2  or 0.5m3 can hold a server 
and several terabytes of storage space. This could replace 
several large rooms of paper based storage, realising 
significant savings in reduced rental costs for floor space 
and supporting infrastructure. Reduced labour expense in 
the physical retrieval and re-storage of the record is also 
found in itself a further significant cost saving to a 
business. 
What makes this current push more volatile is that the 
systems that are being delivered by vendors are becoming 
more multi-functional and at the same time monolithic. A 
SQL enabled DBMS allows application developers to 
produce a single data entry and aggregation point for all 
medical practice business billing, notes, pharmacy, 
pathology, tests etc a sound business concept in theory. 
This philosophy is very problematic for securing all 
information about a patient i.e one breach on one level and 
an attacker potentially has the complete picture.  
These market trends and forces are now bringing a 
significant threat profile in the form of SQL injection and 
manipulation within reach of a medical practices client 
records. No longer does an attacker need to be physically 
present to see the medical record they simply purloin or 
modify the information across the ether connecting the 
medical practice to a more purportedly, productive world. 
 
2 What is SQL injection? 
SQL injection is normally made possible as a result of 
programming flaws in an application that allow for 
changing the query parameters. This is a result of poor 
validation or checking of the input. It is a common 
misconception that the, well known, SQL slammer worm 
 was an SQL injection attack, but it was actually a result of 
a serious flaw/exploit in the underlying server 
infrastructure. 
SQL injection attacks work because the application layer 
is not properly checked for its input[1]. In fact it is possible 
to perform a SQL injection attack on a properly secure and 
patched SQL server as it is simply responding to the SQL 
query it receives. The queries, which in these cases has 
been intercepted or modified by attacker interactions, 
remain legitimate or accurate SQL syntax after 
modification by the attacker. 
To illustrate this, take a SQL procedure that takes a 
username and password as input on a web based login form 
box that could look like Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Login prompt 
 
 
"select * from database.user 
where username=’ " . $userName . " ’ and 
password=password(’ ". $passWord . " ’);" 
 
Instead of a valid user-name, the malicious user sets the 
$userName variable to the string:  ’ or 1=1; - -’, causing the 
CGI script to issue the following SQL query to the 
database: 
 
"select * from database.user  
    where username=’’ or 1=1;-- ’ and 
password=password(’ ". $passWord . " ’);" 
 
The problem here is that - - is the SQL comment command 
i.e all text after this is ignored so now the query really reads 
like 
 
select * from database.user where username=’’ or 1=1; 
This means that the database will now return a list of 
usernames to the screen of the attacker and they can go 
about attempt a break in by password guessing. This is a 
simple select statement in SQL which is principal used to 
query or extract information from a database. A more 
sinister form of attack is when the attacker actually uses the 
INSERT or UPDATE statements in SQL to create or 
modify an existing record using similar mechanics of 
modification. There are various other methods of attack 
using SQL injection techniques that are already well 
documented. It is not necessary to include each variant in 
this paper as its progress as an exploit is well beyond proof 
of concept [1-5]. As one software developer put it, "From 
the outside, all SQL injections look the same. But there are 
five or six ways to set up a call that has SQL injections."[2] 
The point of the previous explanatory text was to illustrate 
the ease of attacks. 
The major problem with this form of attack is that if 
there is no integrity checking run on the database inputs, 
modification can be undertaken at will by an attacker 
without fear of detection. Many intrusion detection systems 
are still not fully checking for this type of malicious input 
into a system hence the data streams will be allowed 
through. One of the other issues is that supporting server 
side scripting architectures such as PHP and Microsoft 
ASP have some limited in-built methods for checking for 
such inputs with most requiring action from the application 
developer. PHP has for instance magic_quotes which 
checks for and can help against such incursions but it must 
be enabled it is not set on by default. 
 
3 How feasible are attacks on medical 
records? 
The use of SQL injection attack, and the subsequent 
consequences to a medical information system, can only be 
described as potentially catastrophic and life threatening. 
The ability to potentially change any data contained within 
a database of this sort is simply not an acceptable option. 
However, potentially many custom built SQL applications 
are susceptible to these attacks and that includes medical 
systems.  
The enabler of this type of attack is simply a broadband 
connection that allows an attacker to probe your server. 
Now many people reading this would postulate that it is 
impossible to target medical systems specifically, think 
again. Using Google or similar search engines an attacker 
can target systems with a high probability that they are 
medical systems. Some simple targeting examples follow 
in Table 1.  The examples given here allow for broad 
reconnaissance of the Internet for host to potentially 
compromise. A more determined attacker can actually use 
Google or other search engines to interrogate a domain 
name or website of a medical practice. This is standard 
practice now for many penetration testing schemes and 
there are several published books to aid you in using search 
engines for this purpose[6].  Further specificity can be 
arrived at by using domain name interrogation and other IP 
probing tools such Nmap[7].  
  
          Table 1 Sample Google Queries 
Google Query Hits 
intitle:medical inurl:login 20000 hits 
inurl:surgery inurl:login   899 hits 
inurl:doctor inurl:login  695 hits 
intitle:hospital inurl:login  696 hits 
intitle:patient inurl:login 682 hits 
The reason that this is a risk is that for many small 
businesses is the actual web server that serves web content 
itself may be contained on the practice SQL server. In fact 
many vendor products designed for small businesses 
actually encourage this sort of deployment e.g Microsoft 
Small Business Server suite by providing a monolithic 
solution to the provision of business applications and 
services. 
 
4 Mitigating against SQL injection 
The following are some simple steps that medical 
practises can take to secure there client or practise 
management systems from SQL injection. These are by no 
means an exhaustive list of options but are the relatively 
easy to effect and can great reduce or even nullify the 
threat of SQL injection from external attackers. 
 
4.1 Simple Infrastructure Changes 
As mentioned before, vendors will often encourage using 
a monolithic architecture i.e. all components on one server 
by having a one size fits all small business server 
“solution”. This server normally serves the SQL database, 
web services, web proxy and is used to connect directly to 
the Internet. The connection to the Internet in most of these 
cases is via an ADSL router or similar broadband based 
router directly connected to the server. At best a simple 
dual bastion design is utilised in these situations to protect 
the network. This network design is not the strongest and is 
becoming increasingly ineffective against newer attacks. 
Cost is a factor in any business and more so often in 
smaller business were economies of scale and profitability 
may not be as high.  But regardless of cost a risk that is 
potential business terminator should not be too heavily 
discounted in considering risk for a medical practise. 
Significant security advantage can be gained by separating 
the practice/client SQL server from the Internet and web 
access server and using a DMZ mentality see Figure 2.   
The purchase of a new Internet and web server to 
physically separate servers will easily be defrayed against 
the significant risk this purchase reduces. It will help also 
mitigate risk of other Internet borne attacks such as viruses 
and spyware which is significant and warrants factoring 
into this decision. 
Figure 2 – DMZ Deployment SQL Server  
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The use of a de-militarized zone (DMZ) with firewalling 
and routing will afford a higher level of protection for the 
SQL server. The SQL server would no longer be accessible 
directly from the Internet sitting behind the DMZ in the 
private network with the practice computers. This type of 
defensive arrangement would hamper significantly the 
possible reconnaissance from search engines and other 
simple attack methods that could be employed by hackers 
on a monolithic system.  
One of the common misconceptions in network security 
is that the use of network switch will prevent/stop a hacker 
from penetrating a network further, this is simply not true. 
The use of ARP poisoning software such as ettercap [8] 
which is readily available from the Internet will allow the 
attacker to penetrate a network switch.  
Effective firewalling technology is often seen as 
expensive and in the domicile of scientists in white coats 
this is no longer the case. Many commodity based ADSL 
routers for instance have been certified by the same testing 
schemas that are applied to large enterprise level firewalls 
and have proven equally fit for purpose[9]. Furthermore, 
modern operating systems now have as there base 
operating system a competent firewalling system that can 
further strengthen defences. 
 
4.2 Input or Data Sanitisation  
Removal of any unwanted characters say ' , " , ; , or - - 
from the received from the input stream. Allowing these 
 types of characters that are correct SQL syntax may allow 
SQL injection attacks to be performed on your SQL based 
application.   
However, one particular problem from an SQL injection 
viewpoint is that you will need to allow certain special 
characters such as '  or - so a patients name such as O'Bree 
or Della-Agostini could be used in the application. Now 
while the use of such characters is good for correct name 
syntax it is bad in mitigating SQL injection via syntactic 
insertion. The alternative is to replace the characters with a 
close substitute such as  '  with ‘ or a character as that 
would not represent or be legitimate SQL syntax. By doing 
this substitution it would be useful for the mitigating 
against propagation of SQL injection attempts. The 
converse however would have to happen for display of 
database records in reports such as queries or output to 
other systems otherwise the names would be grammatically 
incorrect. 
It is interesting to note that such routines for cleansing or 
substitution can have significant reuse in all aspects of the 
application and often only need to be created once and 
reused via calls to the validation of substitution procedure. 
 
4.3 Strict SQL database permissions  
Allowing unrestricted access to the SQL application 
although it might be expedient for development of systems 
it is not ideal for their eventual deployment and will cause 
security issues for the owner of the software. A proper 
mapping of appropriate DBMS read or write permissions 
for each role within the system can mitigate against SQL 
injection. This is typically done at the developer level 
which is achieved by giving only necessary permissions to 
the user or procedure to perform that particular job 
function or process. In databases this is accomplished 
typically via the use of views. A view is used typically for 
displaying queries so unless a user needs to directly update 
a record they should see only a read-only version of the 
record (view).  
 
4.4 Reducing Customisation 
By using a stored and tested procedure instead of 
allowing dynamic queries in your SQL based applications. 
This will reduce the chance of such attacks and if properly 
tested and constructed should also increase server 
efficiency and performance gains are also garnered by this 
approach by restricting inappropriate resource usage. As an 
example a user can not accidentally query or modify the 
entire database schema by the input of an inappropriate 
query parameter. The same logic is then applied to 
malicious codes if no query interface is given then the 
presentation of malformed SQL code becomes a difficult 
outcome to achieve. 
 
4.5 Simple System Auditing 
The use of some of the in-built auditing tools in most 
SQL server implementations could provide at least alerting 
that some malicious activity is being undertaken. 
Furthermore, conventional performance measuring tools 
provide with server operating systems might indicate an 
unnecessary large server load as a result of intense SQL 
queries being run in non-business hours. Incidents of these 
types are relatively easy to detect as a system over time will 
tend towards a normalised pattern of loads and behaviours 
from its users.  
 
5 Conclusion 
SQL injection may seem a reasonably esoteric subject for 
medical practices to consider in a threat profile.  However, 
as medical practices become more dependent on the use of 
information and network technology they will need to avail 
themselves of security posture and countermeasure beyond 
simple virus protection and simple firewalling. Information 
contained on medical systems is systems of interest to more 
than the stereotypical hacker who lays waste to data with 
impunity or wants to “ownz” the system. The target group 
for such systems data includes a wide range of attack 
profiles and motivations. A dialogue between stakeholders 
in this arena should be on-going and is vital if we are to 
protect data from deletion or even worse modification. 
Further practical research is about to be started from an 
Australian context where the leading products in this area 
of practice/client management which utilize SQL will be 
fully penetration tested for SQL injection and range of 
other ancillary security threats. It is hoped that all of the 
software tested goes through unscathed and is robust. 
Finally, as people can literally live or die as a result of the 
data held in these systems it does bring new meaning to the 
words data integrity or would it be better couched as 
patient integrity.  
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